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Fordism to Free Trade: An Explanation
of the Shift Towards Globalisation
Co//n McLeay
New Zealanders tuning into television news on the
evening of December 1, 1999, were confronted with
images ofdemonstrators in downtownSeattle breaking
windows, vandalizing vehicles, and setting fires. As
police sought to control rioters, arresting hundreds of
demonstrators, television viewers were informed that
the scenes in Seattle were reminiscent ofthe civil rights
and anti-war protests that shook the United States in
the 1960s. While American civil rights and anti-war
protests were responses to domestic policy initiatives,
the demonstrations in Seattle were organised by
individuals from numerous countries, united in their
suspicion of global free trade agendas.
Cohn McLeay teaches geography at
Tauranga University College of the
University of Waikato. His particular
interests are in cultural production,
globalisation, andurban entrepreneuriahisrn.
The numbers of demonstrators in Seattle, and their
willingness to face arrest, highlights the passion that
can be aroused when `free trade' and `globalisation' are
being debated. Clearly, different responses to socio
economic change reflect different perspectives on the
positive and/or negative impacts of globalisation. The
nature of individual reactions to globalisation are
influenced by information sourced from print and
audio-visual media, from public meetings and
discussions, and from conversations held in the
workplace and at home. These `sites' of information
express particular accounts of globalisation and may
be positioned on a continuum between being supportive
or critical, abridged or detailed, balanced or biased,
abstract or emotional. In general, it may be argued
that media outlets or individuals will present that
information which best supports their particular
position.
The purpose of this article is to move beyond
overtly subjective or emotional accounts of
globalisation, providing an historical overview of events
that lead to the emergence ofprocesses ofglobalisation.
The `global shifts' that have affected virtually all
industrialised economies since the 1 97Os may be traced
to a "crisis of capitalism" that originated from the
breakdown of "Fordist regimes of accumulation"
Clarke, 1992:13. As such, the `story' presented below
highlights the economic imperatives that underpin
the development of processes of globalisation; while
global shifts have had a profound impact on cultural
codes and commodities, it is widely agreed that such
transformations were largely responses to economic
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developments. Beginning with an explanation of
`Fordism', this article accounts for the development of
the `long boom' in the 1950s and 1960s, explores the
economic decline that characterised the 1970s, and
discusses the rise of `global' networks of production
and consumption in the l980s and l990s.
The meaning of Fordism
The origins of the term `Fordism' may be traced to
the methods of mass production introduced by the
American industrialist Henry Ford and developed by
the Ford Motor Company beginning in the second
decade of the twentieth century. The organisational
regimes and labour processes implemented by Ford
were based on the fragmentation of production tasks,
an approach most clearly expressed through the
assembly line. The assembly line reduced labour time
and costs by separating production processes from
assembly functions, and by allowing for the mass
production of standardised components. Workers,
however, did not approve of the assembly line system
and resisted its implementation by interrupting
production, sabotaging quality controls, and taking
extended sick leave. In order to placate his workers,
Ford shortened the working day to eight hours and
increased daily wages to five dollars. In addition to
reducing labour problems and increasing productivity,
the eight-hour, five-dollar-day created conditions in
which workers had sufficient income and leisure time
to consume the mass-produced goods being
manufactured on assembly lines Harvey, 1989:126.
By the late i92Os many firms in the United States
and Europe had followed the lead set by the Ford
Motor Company, introducing mass production
manufacturing techniques and enjoying increased
profits, In the 1930s, however, low business activity
and increased competition associated with the Great
Depression reduced profit margins. In response to
these conditions, employers removed the five-dollars-
a-day wage. As wages were cut workers could no longer
buy as many goods as previously, leading to a decline
in demand. Falling demand further reduced company
profitability and exacerbated recessionary trends. In
order to stimulate economic activity, the United States
government, led by President Roosevelt, implemented
a series of `New Deal' policies. Introduced in 1933, the
New Deal policies sought to regulate economic activity
and extend the state's responsibility for the provision
of welfare services. Before the New Deal policies could
be effectively implemented, however, World War Two
intervened and workers and capitalists agreed to set
aside their differences in favour of a `patriotic' effort to
mass produce military equipment.
The post-war long boom
Immediately after the end of the Second World War
governments in industrialised nations, such as the
United States ofAmerica, Britain, Australia, NewZealand,
Canada, implemented a series of wide-ranging policy
interventions designed to increase employment and aid
industrial reconstruction. While the specific forms of
intervention varied greatly, the majority of industrialised
nations achieved stable economic growth and a rising
material living standard through adopting models of
Keynesian economic management Harvey, 1989:135.
Based on the theories of the British economist John
Maynard Keynes, Keynesian economic policies relied on
the state manipulating the economy to maintain levels of
investment and overall demand for goods and services
Fagan and Webber, 1994:124. For example, by varying
tax rates, interest rates andpublic expendituregovernments
aimed to control inflation, maintain high employment,
and reduce business fluctuations.
The success of Keynesian state interventions in the
i9SOs and 1960s relied upon the support of company
owners capitalists and workers. Indeed, the Fordist
Keynesian configuration of mass production practices
and state policies that characterised the post-war long
boom was based on an `uneasy truce' between
governments, capitalists, and workers. In the majority
of countries, this `truce' had corporate Owners agreeing
to investment programmes that would increase
productivity and the living standards of workers;
national governments implementing policies designed
to increase levels of employment and provide welfare
support for citizens; and, workers accepting wage rises
in payment for adhering to rigid working practices
and non-strike conditions. An important outcome of
these wage agreements was that sufficient income was
distributed to workers to support the consumption of
industrial products on a mass scale, a feature that
guaranteed that demand would keep pace with supply
Lipietz, 1982:35. The success ofthe Fordist-Keynesian
compromise was such that industrialised nations
experienced almost 20 years of economic growth and
low unemployment. This period, from the early l9SOs
to the early l970s, is the so-called `long boom'.
The international spread of Fordist-Keynesian
agreements in the years following World WarTwo was
based on the manufacture of several "core" products in
large manufacturing districts.
Cars, ship-building, and transport equipment, steel,
petrochemicals, rubber, consumer electrical goods,
and construction became the propulsive engines of
economic growth, focused on a series of grand
production regions in the world economy - the
Midwest of the United States, the Ruhr-Rhinelands
fin GermanyJ, the West Midlands of Britain, the
Tokyo-Yokohama production region Harvey,
1989:132.
The principal means by which mass production
techniques were integrated internationally was through
the activities of transnational corporations TNCs,
exemplified by such companies as Ford motor vehicle
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manufacturing, with a head office in the United States,
Philip Morris tobacco and foodstuffs, United States,
Siemens electronics, Germany, Nestle food,
Switzerland and ICI industrial chemicals, United
Kingdom. While large companies had been involved
in international trade since the mid-nineteenth
century, TNCs were unique in that they relied on
intra-firm trade, whereby products were transferred
from one branch or plant of a corporation to another
across international boundaries Fagan and Wcbber,
1994:15. The most obvious expression of intra-firm
trade was through large Anglo-American firms using
mines and plantations in South America and Africa
to supply raw materials for products manufactured in
the United States, Europe or the United Kingdom.
These trans-national activities ensured that TNCs
were central to the rapid acceleration of international
production during the long boom Dicken, 1992:4.
Furthermore, as TNCs expanded their international
operations in the 1950s and 1960s they came to own
and operate increasing numbers of farms and mines in
`peripheral' countries in Africa, Asia and South
America. The ability of TNCs to maintain
international trading networks was helped by
developments in transport and communication
technologies. For example, the development of
commercial jet aircraft, the simplification of cargo
transfer, and advances in communication technology
revolutionised the ability ofTNCs to operate over vast
geographical distances Dicken, 1992:108.
The end of the long boom
Despite the ability ofTNCs to balance international
production and trade networks, by the early 1970s
many capitalist producers and national-economies
had begun to experience a slowdown in economic
growth. While signs ofthe impending `crisis ofFordism'
were evident several years earlier, it took the collapse of
the Bretton Woods Agreement in 1971 and the effects
of the `oil shock' of 1973 to set in motion a whole set of
processes that undermined the Fordist-Keynesian
compromise and the success ofthe `long boom' Harvey,
1989: 145. The Bretton Woods Agreement was
formulated at a meeting between officials from the
United States, Britain and Canada in 1944. Named
after the North American town where the meeting was
held, the Bretton Woods Agreement was designed to
facilitate post-war reconstruction by instituting
international conditions covering trade relationships
and financial dealings.
One of the regulations imposed by the Bretton
Woods Agreement ,ensured that the United States
government would convert overseas holdings ofUnited
States dollars to gold at a fixed rate of$US3S per ounce
of gold. This meant that foreign governments and
businesses could rely on currency stability and, therefore,
predictability in terms of the international pricing of
goods. The Bretton Woods Agreement worked well
during the l950s and early l960s, "the golden age of
capitalism in the developed world" Corbridge and
Thrift, 1994:7, a period during which the United
States maintained a budget surplus. By the late
1960s, however, expenditure associated with the
Cold War with the Soviet Union, the war in
Vietnam, and re-armament programmes in Western
Europe had turned the United States budget surplus
into a deficit.
Despite holding a budget deficit, as long as overseas
governments withheld from exchanging their financial
reserves for gold, the United States was able to continue
to guarantee the gold reserve that underpinned
international currency stability. As `foreign' economies
accumulated increasingly large currency reserves, and
the American balance ofpayments situation worsened,
however, it became obvious in the late 1960s that
overseas funds would eventually dwarf the size of the
United States gold reserves Strange, 1994. With the
possibility that foreign governments would demand
the United States swap their currency reserves for
American gold, the Nixon administration decided to
end the role of the United States as the `world's
banker'. With the United States dollar no longer
backed by gold, its value was determined according to
international confidence in its trading worth.
Given that the United States dollar had provided a
stable benchmark for other currencies for twenty
years, the removal of gold reserve had enormous
impacts Corbridge and Thrift, 1994. For example,
governments that had relied on the security provided
by the American gold reserve, of which there were
many, found that, like America, their currency value
fluctuated depending on international confidence.
For individuals or companies involved in international
trade, currency instability ensured there was price
instability, meaning there was no guarantee that the
amount of goods bought for "x" dollars one week
would cost the same the next week. Such price
fluctuations increased competition and forced many
traders out of business.
Two years after the United States abandoned the
Bretton Woods Agreement, the Organisation of
Petroleum Exporting Countries OPEC increased
prices for oil. Between October 1973 andJanuary 1974,
OPEC, a powerful cartel of oil producers headed by
Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq and Kuwait, raised the price
of oil. Implemented in response to the Arab Israeli
War, these price rises led to a panic in oil markets. As
oil and oil-based products were a central input into
heavy industries, increases in production costs
stemming from oil price rises had a significant impact
on corporate profit. The productivity and profitability
of industrial producers was also hindered by increasing
wage costs. The high demand for labour that had
accompanied post-war policies of full employment had
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strengthened trade unions, and worker organisations
used their growing power to obtain large wage increases.
While commodity price rises provided a short-term
panacea for rising material and labour costs, one long-
term result of this strategy was an increase in levels of
inflation. Increasing inflation generally served to
reduce company profits by raising labour costs. As
profits continued to fall and labour costs continued to
rise, industrialised nations experienced widespread
depression in both capital-intensive industries e.g.
steel, shipbuilding, vehicles, appliances and labour-
intensive industries e.g. textiles, clothing, footwear
Knox and Agnew, 1994:2 10.
Responses to recession
In order to retain profitability during the recession
ofthe 19 70s some TNCs began to shift operations away
from core to peripheral countries. By locating
manufacturing facilities in so-called `Newly
Industrialising Countries' NICs in East and South
East Asia South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore,
Taiwan, Malaysia, Thailand, Latin America Brazil,
Mexico, and Southern Europe Spain, Portugal,
Greece, TNCs were able to produce manufactured
components and commodities relatively cheaply. These
goods were then exported back to core markets, mainly
the United States and the United Kingdom.
The success of the move to the periphery relied
on several inter-related factors: an increase in
automation that facilitated the employment of low-.
cost semi- or un-skilled workers; production
fragmentation that enabled components to be
manufactured in the periphery and assembled into
a `whole' in the core of industrialised nations; and,
the rapid transit of goods and information between
dispersed localities Pagan and Webber, 1994:37.
While expansion into peripheral nations seemed to
offer a solution to the profitability crisis facing
TNCs, it did not take long for production bases in
core economies to be undermined by imports sourced
from NICs. The export successes of NICs stemmed
from their adoption of mass production techniques
but not the labour relations or national economic
policies that had regulated production and
consumption in the core. Without competitive
constraints imposed by wage bargains with labour
and state sanctioned stability in both products and
prices, NICs were able to build their economies
around exports to mass markets elsewhere
Schoenberger, 1988.
As NICs increased their status as industrial
producers during the 1970s so the range of products
they manufactured broadened. `The major growth in
exports [from NICs] after the mid-1970s occurred in
traditional products that in the past were associated
with the industrial countries of Western Europe and
North America: electrical and non-electrical
machinery, transport equipment, chemicals, and iron
and steel' Fagan and Webber, 1994:22.
Global shifts
Faced with increasing competition from NICs, costs
associated with the employment of unionised labour,
and taxation regimes enforced to maintain domestic
welfare programmes, corporations in core economies
began to reorganise their production systems. The
result of industrial reorganisation was `the
deindustrialisation of the core economies' Knox and
Agnew, 1994:208, expressed most obviously through
decline in those sectors that had underpinned economic
growth in the 1950s and 1960s, such as shipbuilding,
and textile and motor vehicle manufacture. Dicken
1992:429-35 suggests that the most significant
influences on deindustrialisation were a worldwide
recession that increased levels of unemployment and
technological changes that tended to be labour-saving
rather than job-creating.
In a `global shift' that was designed to alleviate the
financial impacts of deindustrialisation in the core,
many firms established overseas branch plants or
international subcontracting alliances. Such linkages
furthered deindustrialisation in the core, while also
signalling a shift from `international' to `global'
networks of trade and exchange Probert, 1993.
`Internationalisation' refers simply to the increasing
spread of economic activities across national
boundaries; as such it is not a new phenomenon.
`Globalisation' of economic activity is qualitatively
different. It is a more advanced and complex form
of internationalisation which implies a degree of
functional integration between internationally
dispersed economic activities. Globalisation is a
much more recent phenomenon than
internationalisation Dicken, 1992:1.
Such. `functional integration' defines the way in
which corporations maintain strategies that are
sensitive to local market conditions and yet are also
able to function as a globally integrated unit. Using
the automobile industry as an example, this `global
localisation' has expressed itself in two obvious ways.
Firstly, rather than establishing complete
manufacturing and assembly plants in numerous
individual countries, large vehicle manufacturers have
developed a network of numerous specialist
manufacturing sites that supply a few centralised
assembly plants. For example, Figure 1 shows the
complex component sourcing network the Ford Motor
Company has for the Ford Escort model that is
assembled in England.
Secondly, firms will mix their globally sourced
vehicle components in different ways to suit the demands
ofparticular markets. For example, Mair 1997 reports
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Figure 1: The component sourcingnetworkforthe Ford Escort in Europe Source: Dicken, 1992,301.
that Honda motor cars sold in America may share
engines and transmissions with Japanese models, but
differ in interior aesthetics. Or a European model may
share everything but handling components and
aesthetics with a Japanese model. Mair 1997:71 notes
that the key issue for the Honda Motor Company is
"to put all the pieces together for each local market in
a way that both meets the requirements in that market
and also permits economies of scale and acceptance
of the product in other Honda regions".
The `functional integration' that is central to
globalisation has created a new form of corporate entity.
The most recent, quite newly emerging for of spatial
structure is that of the `global corporation' - a
massively multinationalised entity . . . which spans
a variety ofsectors ofproductionboth manufacturing
and services and which is organised not so much
from a centre in one country from which the
tentacles of power spread out to others, but on a
truly international basis, with a global profits strategy,
a view of a world divided for this purpose into
regions, each with their own operational
headquarters, and with. . . no particular country
called `home' Massey, 1994:159.
While TNCs and/or global corporations had a key
role in creating and advancing global processes,
national governments contributed by introducing
policies that undermined existing social welfare and
labour market conditions. As Knox and Agnew
1994 explain, electoral victories by right-of-centre
political parties in many industrialised economies
during the l970s and 1980s were associated
with an ideological stance based on the belief that
the welfare state had not only generated unreasonably
high levels oftaxation, budget deficits, disincentives
to work and save, and a bloated class ofunproductive
workers, but also that it may have fostered `soft'
attitudes towards `problem' groups in society Knox
and Agnew, 1994:237-238.
While the style and time-frame ofthe retrenchment
that characterised this `new conservatism' differed
from country to country, most state sector restructuring
programmes implemented in the 1970s and 1980s
relied on the privatisation of public services health,
housing, education and spending cuts to
unemployment and superannuation benefits Britton,
Le Heron and Pawson, 1992. As part of these
programmes of restructuring national governments
re-regulated border control policies, effectively `opening
up' their economies to increased flows of off-shore
goods, services, and investment funds.
Conclusion
In seeking to open their economies to overseas
investors, thus creating a `global market', national
governments were helped by large global corporations.
Rather than being monolithic, governments and
businesses exist because of the actions and activities of
a host of individuals, be they politicians, bureaucrats,
executives and labourers. As with any group of people,
SOURCE
COUNTRY
United Kingdom
COMPONENT
France
Canada
U.S.A.
Spain
Italy
Switzerland
Japan
West Germany
rockerarm,clutch, ignition, exhaust, oil pump, distributor, cylinder bolt, cylinder
head,flywheel ring gear, heater, speedometer, battery, read wheel spindle, intake
manifold, fuel tank, switches, lamps, front disc, steering wheel, steering column,
glass weatherstrips, locks
alternator, cylinder head, master cylinder, brakes, underbody coating, weatherstrips,
clutch release bearings, steering shaft & joints, seat pads & frames, transmission
cases, clutch cases, tyres, suspension bushes, ventilation units, heater, hose clamps,
sealers, hardware
glass, radio
wheel nuts, hydraulic tappet, glass
wiring harness, radiator& heater hoses, fork clutch release, airfilter, battery,
mirrors
cylinder head, carburettor, glass, lamps, defroster grills
underbody coating, speedometer gears
starter, alternator, cone & roller bearings, windscreen washerpump
locks, pistons, exhaust, ignition, switches, front disc, distributor, weatherstrips,
rocker arm, speedometer, fuel tank, cylinder bolt, cylinder head gasket, front wheel
knuckles, read wheel spiundle, transmission cases, clutch cases, clutch, steering
column, battery, glass
tyres, paints, hardware
hose clamps, cylinder bolt, exhaust down pipes, pressings, hardware
exhaust flanges, tyres
Netherlands
Sweden
Norway
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regardless of how coherent they appear to `outsiders',
these individuals all have particular ideas and emotions,
thoughts and passions. Given the diversity inherent
in any group or community, it is difficult to make
assumptions about the exact path globalisation will
take in the future. Indeed, as events in Seattle showed,
thewidespread acceptance ofthe inevitably ofglobalisation
is not assured. With historic evidence showing that
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